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ABSTRACT 
 
 
From August to November 1940, the territories of French Equatorial Africa 
rallied to Charles de Gaulle’s self-proclaimed Free French government in London, rather 
than the Vichy government set up after the German defeat of France in June. While this 
episode concerns European actions in European-ruled colonies, African actors pervade 
the story, especially as soldiers. Africans constituted the indirect audience of all the 
rallies by living in the territories whose policies were affected. Africans served as actors 
in the role of soldiers. As soldiers, African actors exhibited agency both in actions taken 
during operations and by their presence in the colonial military. African audiences also 
demonstrated agency in their responses to actions in the rallies and circumstances around 
them, though their exclusion from many public forums limited the extent to which they 
could influence policy or document their efforts. Though Africans did not direct the 
rallies in AEF, they significantly influenced the outcomes within the constraints set up by 
the colonial system. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On August 26, 1940, French Guyana-born Félix Éboué stood alongside the 
military commander of the French colony of Chad as the commander announced that 
Chad would align itself with Charles de Gaulle’s self-proclaimed French government in 
London, rather than the French government under Marshal Pétain set up at Vichy after 
the German defeat of France in May-June 1940. At 2 AM the next morning in 
neighboring French-ruled Cameroon, two envoys from Charles de Gaulle landed along 
with less than thirty Frenchmen in canoes on the docks of Douala. With a few key allies 
in the port city, he seized control of the city and proclaimed himself in control of the 
entire colony, which he announced would henceforth be aligned with de Gaulle. On 
August 28, 1940, another Gaullist envoy crossed from Léopoldville (now Kinshasa) in 
the Belgian Congo to Brazzaville in French Moyen-Congo, announcing that he too would 
take power in the name of de Gaulle after an armed insurrection ousted the pro-Vichy 
governor. The next day in inland Oubangui-Chari (now Central African Republic), the 
governor announced his territory would also align with Charles de Gaulle, prompting a 
brief battle for control of the territorial capital with a pro-Vichy army officer. The one 
remaining territory in this federation of French Equatorial Africa (AEF), Gabon, 
announced its alignment with de Gaulle on the 30
th
, only to retract it the next day. Only
2 
 
after a prolonged military campaign from its neighboring colonies would Gabon also 
align itself with Charles de Gaulle.
1
 
Publics outside France and Central Africa have rarely heard of this early chapter 
in the Second World War, and it has generated almost no historical scholarship in 
English. Even within French literature and the limited English-language historiography, 
more has been written analyzing the rule of Pétain’s Vichy government in French West 
Africa (AOF)
2
 and other theaters,
3
 with little attention paid to the territories of AEF.
4
  
                                                             
1 For broad accounts of these events in widely available published sources see: Edgard de Larminat, 
Chroniques irrévérencieuses (Paris: Plon, 1962), 134-161; Brian Weinstein, Éboué (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), 230-251; and Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre. De l’appel du 18 
juin à la Libération volume 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 140-150. Online accounts are also available through 
the Fondation de la France Libre website: For Brazzaville, see M.J. Rochette, “La « maison des 
conspirateurs » ou les dessous du coup d'État de Brazzaville,” extract from Revue de la France Libre, no. 
75 (February 1955), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignages-documents/temoignages/maison-
conspirateurs.php (accessed April 3, 2012). For Cameroon, see Général Roger Gardet, “Le ralliement du 
Cameroun à la France Libre (27 août 1940),” extract from Revue de la France Libre no. 207 (août-
septembre-octobre 1974), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignages-
documents/temoignages/ralliement-cameroun-fl.php (accessed April 3, 2012); Médécin-général inspecteur 
Guy Chauliac, “L’AEF et le Cameroun se rallient,” extract from Revue de la France Libre, no. 288 (4e 
trimester, 1994), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignages-documents/temoignages/aef-
cameroun.php (accessed April 3, 2012); for Chad, “Le Tchad et le Congo,” extract from Revue de la 
France Libre, no. 156 bis (June 1965), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignages-
documents/temoignages/tchad-et-congo.php (accessed April 8, 2012). 
2 One might characterize this phenomenon as a Vichy Syndrome in reverse: fixation on the Vichy Empire, 
with little critical attention to the Gaullist Empire. The reasons for this, perhaps rooted in the conflation of 
the wartime Gaullist narrative of resurrection with De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic presidency of 
decolonization, need further exploration. On Vichy’s role in administering AOF, see: Ruth Ginio, “Marshal 
Petain Spoke to Schoolchildren: Vichy Propaganda in French West Africa, 1940-1943,” The International 
Journal of African Historical Studies 33:2 (2000): 291-312; William I. Hitchcock, “Pierre Boisson, French 
West Africa, and the Postwar Epuration: A Case from the Aix Files,” French Historical Studies 24:2 
(Spring 2001): 305-341; Ruth Ginio, “Vichy Rule in French West Africa: Prelude to Decolonization?” 
French Colonial History 4 (2003): 205-226; and Harry Gamble, “The National Revolution in French West 
Africa: Dakar-Jeunes and the shaping of African opinion,” International Journal of Francophone Studies 
10:1+2 (2007): 85-103. For a territorial focus across the Vichy and Gaullist periods, see for example Jean-
Noël Loucou, “La Deuxième guerre mondiale et ses effets en Côte-d’Ivoire,” Annales de l’Université 
d’Abidjan 8 (1980): 181-207. On AOF’s involvement with Gaullism, see: Denise Bouche, “Le retour de 
l’Afrique Occidentale Française dans la lutte contre l’ennemi aux côtés des Alliés,” Revue d’histoire de la 
Deuxième guerre mondiale no. 114 (1979): 41-68; Nancy Lawler, “Reform and Repression under the Free 
French: Economic and Political Transformation in the Côte d’Ivoire, 1942-45,” Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute 60:1 (1990): 88-110; Nancy Lawler, “The Crossing of the Gyaman to the 
Cross of Lorraine: Wartime Policies in West Africa, 1941-1942,” African Affairs 96:382 (January 1997): 
53-71; Ruth Ginio, “French Colonial Reading of Ethnographic Research: The Case of the ‘Desertion’ of the 
Abron King and its Aftermath,” Cahiers d’Études Africaines 42:166 (2002): 337-357. 
3 On Vichy’s imperial policies generally, see: Eric Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics: The National Revolution 
in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
3 
 
At face value, the preceding narrative appears as a European story told in the 
context of a European war, only by happenstance taking place on African soil. While it is 
a story about Europeans’ actions in European-ruled colonies, African actors pervade the 
story, especially as soldiers.
5
 Therefore, this study will examine these events
6
 from an 
African perspective. Without an African perspective on August-November 1940, we lose 
the voices of the majority of those involved and impacted, French society retains a false 
image of European officers operating in a vacuum, and African postcolonial societies fail 
to capture the critical role Africans played in determining their territories’ alignment in 
the Second World War.  
Even though the traditional French narrative of national resurrection prefers to 
root itself in the bravado and will to power from a set of supermen headed by Charles de 
Gaulle, the oft-ignored Africans’ voices deserve hearing as integral parts of the history of 
the Second World War. One European colonist in Cameroon tried to discourage his 
African interpreter from involving himself in the controversy, saying that “you stay here. 
It’s not the same for you.”7 By asking such men to die for the cause of France, though, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2002), especially chapter 1, “Vichy’s Colonial Empire in 1940: A New Colonial Vision,” pp. 9-31; Jacques 
Cantier and Eric Jennings, eds., L’Empire Colonial sous Vichy (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004); and Hubert 
Bonin, Christophe Bouneau, et Hervé Joly, eds., Les entreprises et l’outre-mer français pendant la Seconde 
Guerre mondiale (Pessac: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme d’Aquitaine, 2010). 
4 Bernard Lanne claims that the history of July-August 1940 alone demand a book to themselves. Bernard 
Lanne, “Le Tchad pendant la guerre (1939-1945),” in Charles Robert Ageron, ed., Les Chemins de la 
décolonisation de l’Empire colonial français (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1986), 441. 
5 Some very good scholarship (again, mostly in French), has been done concerning Africans in the First 
World War, most notably by Marc Michel. Work on African involvement in the Second World War has 
tended to focus on Africans serving in Europe, notably: Myron Echenberg, “‘Morts Pour La France’: The 
African Soldier in France During the Second World War,” The Journal of African History 26:4 (1985): 
363-380; and on African POWs, Armelle Mabon, Prisonniers de guerre « indigènes »: Visages oubliés de 
la France occupé (Paris: La Découverte, 2010). 
6 Known as the Trois Glorieuses (Three Glorious Days) of August 26-28, 1940, and the military conquest 
of Gabon. 
7 Jacques Kuoh Moukouri, Doigts noirs : « Je fus Écrivain-Interprète au Cameroun » (Montréal: Les 
éditions à la page, 1963), 80. 
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the pro-Charles de Gaulle Free French, or Gaullists,
8
 made Africans a part of that story. 
The Gaullist Guy Chauliac recognized this in writing that “AEF recommenced the fight 
with African soldiers, two months after the [French] defeat,” thereby earning the right “to 
leave its name in the history of France.”9 
This study stems from European archival materials rather than African sources, 
representing a key limitation. However, the preliminary conclusions culled only from 
European records make the case for further research in Africa, and set an agenda for that 
research, including examination of local press and retrieval of oral histories. As Jérôme 
Ollandet noted, previous historical works have “only presented one version of events, that 
of the colonizer,” and “the portion of history of this era that remains unwritten is that of 
the natives.” Where his work has begun to fill that gap in French, this paper hopes to 
continue in English.
10
 
Two kinds of rallies occurred in AEF. In Chad and Oubangui-Chari, governors 
already in place effected what may be dubbed ‘bureaucratic’ rallies, simply reorienting 
their colony’s policy toward de Gaulle. In Cameroon, Moyen-Congo, and Gabon, 
external actors took power by force, ousting pro-Vichy governors and replacing them 
with Gaullist governments, in what might be called ‘military’ rallies, since soldiers 
intervened to topple the pro-Vichy governments. The rallies involved two kinds of 
people: actors whose actions affected the rallies, and audiences with whom the 
participants came into contact. This study identifies audiences as important because 
                                                             
8 The terms Gaullist and Free French, in opposition to Vichy French, are contemporary terms, and will be 
used interchangeably throughout this study. 
9 Médécin-général inspecteur Guy Chauliac, “L’AEF et le Cameroun se rallient,” extract from Revue de la 
France Libre, no. 288 (4e trimester, 1994), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignages-
documents/temoignages/aef-cameroun.php (accessed April 3, 2012). 
10 Jérôme Ollandet, Brazzaville capitale de la France Libre : Histoire de la résistance française en Afrique 
(1940-1944) (Brazzaville : Éditions de la Savane, n.d.), 9. 
5 
 
observers’ and bystanders’ reactions demonstrated whether they accepted the legitimacy 
of the rallies and offers clues into the way they made sense of the confusing conflicts 
going on around them. 
Africans constituted the indirect audience of all the rallies by living in the 
territories whose policies were affected. Africans participated as soldiers in the rallies of 
Moyen-Congo, Oubangui-Chari, and Gabon.  As soldiers, African actors exhibited 
agency both in actions taken during operations and by their presence in the colonial 
military. African audiences also demonstrated agency in their responses to actions in the 
rallies and circumstances around them, though their exclusion from many public forums 
limited the extent to which they could influence policy or document their efforts. Though 
Africans did not direct the rallies in AEF, they significantly influenced the outcomes of 
the rallies as participants in the rallies and as audiences of the rallies. 
6 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
AFRICAN ACTORS IN THE RALLIES 
 
 
Africans did not begin efforts to rally the colonies of AEF to Charles de Gaulle’s 
Free France. Henri Laurentie, the aide to Félix Éboué who helped orchestrate the rally of 
Chad, attested that the Free French rally movements were in fact executed “outside of the 
native population”11 and the rallies were “conceived and led by the Europeans.”12 This 
truth does not preclude all African agency, since the colonial power structures European 
Gaullists operated in excluded Africans. Indeed, a recent study of the Free French 
movement noted the difficulty inherent in discussing the motivations of African soldiers, 
since their de facto rallies under their commanding officers rested “in the logic of the 
colonial system,” that “the behavior of European officers dictated that of the majority of 
the colonial soldiers under their authority.”13 Studying African soldiers particularly, Éric 
Deroo and Antoine Champeaux claim that African soldiers obeyed their military 
commanders and “followed them and joined the Gaullists.”14 This study argues that in the 
very act of not making a choice, by simply following their officers, Africans determined 
their own behavior, albeit constrained by the colonial system. 
                                                             
11 “Témoignage de Monsieur le Gouverneur LAURENTIE Délégué adjoint de la France à la commission 
du “Trusteeship” témoignage recueilli par Melle GOUINEAU, le 19 octobre 1948 à Versailles (O.N.U.)” p. 
16. Found in Archives Nationales de la France [hereafter AN] AN 72AJ/225/1/pièce 2. 
12 Henri Laurentie, “L’Empire au secours de la Métropole,” p. 15. Found in archives at the Mémorial de 
Caen [hereafter Caen] Caen FL 70(2). 
13 Sébastien Albertelli, Atlas de la France Libre : De Gaulle et la France Libre, une aventure politique 
(Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2010), 14. 
14 Éric Deroo et Antoine Champeaux, La Force Noire : Gloire et infortunes d’une légende coloniale (Paris: 
Tallandier, 2006), 185. 
7 
 
In the bureaucratic rally of Chad, for example, the choice to rally to de Gaulle was 
made by French colonial officials, a stratum that excluded Africans. Europeans, and the 
European-educated appointee Éboué, not Africans, initiated contacts with General de 
Gaulle in London to arrange for a Gaullist alignment, since Africans could not have made 
official contacts with British Nigerian officials.
15
 Europeans, not Africans, participated in 
the often contentious debates over whether or not to comply with the Vichy government’s 
armistices with Germany and Italy, because no one concerned themselves with the 
African population’s opinion.16 The small ‘war council’ that met in Fort-Lamy on August 
26 to confirm Chad’s rally to de Gaulle consisted of Europeans, excepting the Guyanese 
Éboué, but certainly not Africans, whose opinions were neither sought nor consulted.
17
 
This account of African non-action in Chad’s rally tells less about African opinion than 
about the exclusion of African opinion from political policymaking during the colonial 
era, so Africans cannot be condemned as inactive in the movement given they were not 
consulted or empowered to make their voices heard.  
Though Africans were excluded from political and military policymaking, they 
were intimately involved in policy implementation, since Europeans valued Africans as 
soldiers to execute their decisions even though they did not value them as active citizens 
                                                             
15 Laurentie, “L’Empire au secours de la Métropole,” 10-11. Caen FL 70(2).  
16 For example, European residents of Fort-Lamy shouted down Boisson, en route to Dakar to be appointed 
‘High Commissioner for French Black Africa,’ as a “bastard” and “traitor” on July 20, 1940. Cf. 
“Témoignage de Monsieur le Gouverneur LAURENTIE,” 6. AN 72AJ/225/1/pièce 2. That those involved 
in this incident were Europeans is specified in Félix Éboué, “Note sur la situation Politique et Militaire du 
Tchad,” (July 27, 1940), appended in telegram from Éboué to de Gaulle, 3. AN 72AJ/538/2/2 (Le Tchad, 
Divers Notes – Correspondences). Similarly, a European officer, Moitessier, did not engage the African 
soldiery but rather the European officers when he accosted them in early August, asking “what the hell are 
you doing here, if you’re Gaullists?,” “Témoignage de Monsieur le Gouverneur LAURENTIE,” 7. AN 
72AJ/225/1/pièce 2. 
17 “Témoignage de Monsieur le Gouverneur LAURENTIE,” 8. AN 72AJ/225/1/pièce 2. Jonathan Derrick, 
“Free French and Africans in Douala, 1940-41,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 10:2 (June 
1980), 61-62 makes similar observations about the non-consultation of anti-German Cameroonians by the 
Free French operatives at Douala. 
8 
 
making valuable contributions to policymaking. As Pierre Messmer cogently 
summarized, throughout the rallies “no one asked the Africans because no one thought of 
them.”18 Thus, Africans could not serve as actors in the bureaucratic rallies where non-
African policymakers affected the rally, but could serve as soldiers in the military rallies. 
Africans had penetrated the colonial institution of the military voluntarily and by 
conscription: African recruits comprised the majority of the soldiers stationed in AEF in 
1940. These soldiers, only about 30,000 for all of sub-Saharan Africa, constituted mere 
“sovereignty forces” to serve as enforcers of “political order and charged with assuring 
the security of the territory.”19 With such a tiny aggregate population, the participation of 
even small numbers of soldiers could prove decisive in physically securing important 
administrative posts. 
Small glimpses of Africans taking direct action to mobilize their fellow soldiers 
for the Gaullist cause come from Oubangui-Chari. In Oubangui-Chari on July 21, a 
handful of African soldiers joined French reservists in the Bangui garrison in seizing 
arms from a depot around 6 PM and fleeing toward Cameroon in hopes of reaching 
Nigeria and supporting the British war effort.
20
 On August 29, when interim governor de 
Saint-Mart announced to Oubangui-Chari’s pro-Vichy military commandant that he 
would follow Brazzaville in rallying to de Gaulle, “the native troops of the Bangui 
garrison…had passed over to de Gaulle’s side” due to the influence of two African men, 
Georges Koudoukou (known as “the father of the riflemen” for his long service and 
fatherly role among his colleagues), and Sarah Mouniro (who came from a chieftaincy 
                                                             
18 Pierre Messmer, Les Blancs s’en vont: Récits de décolonisation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), 16. 
19 Eugène-Jean Duval, L’épopée des tirailleurs sénégalaises (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005), 239. 
20 Pierre Kalck, Histoire de la République Centrafricaine: des origines préhistoriques à nos jours (Paris: 
Berger-Levrault, 1974), 260. More details on this extraordinary event would likely be available in local 
Bangui press. 
9 
 
family).
21
 More research, particularly in Central African Republic, needs to be done in 
order to flesh out the implications of these fascinating instances of African 
insubordination at a critical juncture. 
Most participation by Africans came as soldiers followed the orders of their 
officers, either executing coups against existing governments for Gaullist officers or 
defending those governments for pro-Vichy officers. Thus, in Moyen-Congo, soldiers’ 
cooperation with their Gaullist officers’ insurrectionism proved critical on August 28, 
with soldiers opting for compliance with their officers. African troops’ effective 
compliance with their officers facilitated the conquest of Gabon, but notable examples of 
non-compliance with pro-Vichy European officers provide valuable insight into African 
agency during the rallies. Africans’ presence in the colonial military demonstrated a 
limited degree of agency, as did their choices to obey their officers whether they aligned 
themselves with de Gaulle or Vichy. 
 
Compliance in Brazzaville 
In Brazzaville, the Gaullist conspirators had seen the African soldiers as the key 
to the operation’s success, particularly due to their Sara ethnicity. The French military 
commanders considered the south Chadian Saras passive civilians but ferocious warriors, 
an ideal combination for colonial military leaders. As a more recent study of the complex 
Franco-Sara relationship recounts, “French administrators never abandoned their 
                                                             
21 Jean-Christophe Notin, 1061 Compagnons: Histoire des Compagnons de la Libération (Paris: Perrin, 
2000), 170. 
10 
 
preference for this southern ethnic group.”22 Known as ‘the beautiful race’ (la belle race) 
for “their proverbial physical fitness,” the French favored the Sara as conscripts because 
they were seen as “docile and passive...useful particularly as a reservoir of manpower.”23 
One eyewitness even traced the stable rally of Chad to the extreme discipline of the 
Chadian Sara.
24
 Contained within the passive colonial, though, the French mobilized and 
mythologized the martial spirit of the Sara, with one recruiter reminiscing on these 
“magnificent types, nearly giants.”25 During the Gabon campaign, French commanders 
felt the need to restrain their Sara soldiers, since “if the Sarra [sic] Tirailleurs were once 
let loose in a major combat it might be difficult to restrain them.”26 Fellow Africans also 
identified a particular ferocity and arrogance in the Sara, with rumors spreading that 
“they had made common cause with the French in their war against the Germans, and in 
the course of this war they had deployed their talents as devastators of countries and 
rapists of women.”27 These common French and African observations lead us to see a 
deeper cultural affinity toward participation in the rallies among Sara troops. Such 
affinities do not preclude individual soldiers’ ability to make choices, but certainly 
strongly shape the context in which Sara soldiers would choose to cooperate with French 
                                                             
22 Mario Azevedo, “The Human Price of Development: The Brazzaville Railroad and the Sara of Chad,” 
African Studies Review 24:1 (March 1981), 1. Azevedo, 8-9 demonstrate French attachment of importance 
to their opinion during the Congo-Océan construction. 
23 René Lemarchand, “The Politics of Sara Ethnicity: A Note on the Origins of the Civil War in Chad,” 
Cahiers d’Études Africaines 20 (1980), 453. 
24 Colonel Jacques Florentin, “Les confins sahariens du Tchad et le colonel Leclerc,” in Le Général Leclerc 
et l’Afrique Française Libre 1940-1942 Actes du Colloque International 12, 13, et 14 novembre 1987 
(Paris: Fondation Maréchal Leclerc de Hauteclocque, 1988), 415. 
25 Joseph Kessel, quoted in André Casalis, “Adrien Conus,” extract from Revue de la France Libre, no. 310 
(4e trimestre 2000), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignages-documents/temoignages/adrien-
conus.php (accessed April 3, 2012). 
26 Entry for October 15 [1940], War Diary, French Equatorial Africa, 20 Military Mission, October 1940. 
Found in United Kingdom National Archives [hereafter UK], WO 178/4, “Military Mission Brazzaville, 
1940 Oct-Dec.” 
27 Henri-Richard Manga Mado, Complaintes d’un forçat (Yaoundé: Éditions CLE, 1970), 48. 
11 
 
officers and engage in martial activity. Rather than dismissing agency, these ethnographic 
observations inform how certain Africans might have made their choices. 
Gaullist authors often specify the ethnicity of the Sara soldiers under Major 
Raymond Delange, stranded in Brazzaville en route for France when the armistice 
intervened, whereas Gaullist writers rarely specify ethnicity elsewhere. Thus, General de 
Larminat’s memoirs identified the Chadian battalion as “constituted of the best Sara 
soldiers.”28 Notin also took note of the Chadian troops’ Sara ethnicity, calling them 
“ardent warriors.”29 Lieutenant Muracciole, writing in 1948, claimed a kind of inherent 
loyalty to the French officers, claiming “Delange could count on his detachment of Sara 
soldiers.”30 Husson also recognized the strength these crack forces gave to Delange, and 
thus attempted to disperse the battalion on August 27 to preclude any plot by Delange.
31
 
Beyond the European’s ethnic assumptions, a geographical loyalty appears to have been 
at work, since a Gaullist officer deployed to mobilize his Sara troops to seize the 
Governor-General’s palace found that they complied readily on hearing of their native 
Chad’s rally.32 
Beyond mere Sara determinism, Africans of several ethnicities executed the 
operation to topple Husson. Africans also defended Husson, since Sicé points out that 
“riflemen [typically referring to African conscripts, known colloquially as tirailleurs, or 
riflemen] patrolled in the city and others kept guard at intersections” in order to inhibit 
                                                             
28 Larminat, 148. 
29 Notin, 167. 
30 Lieutenant J. Muracciole, “La Conquête de la Base Africaine,” in Louis Mouilleseaux, ed., La France et 
son Empire dans la Guerre, v. 1 (Paris: Éditions Littéraires de France, 1947), 90. 
31 A. Sicé, L’Afrique Équatoriale Française et le Cameroun au Service de la France (26-27-28 août 1940) 
(Paris: Presses Univérsitaires de la France, 1946), 153. 
32 Muracciole, “La Conquête de la Base Africaine,” 90. 
12 
 
any clandestine uprising.
33
 Delange made effective use of his African soldiers, however, 
dispatching at least one African corporal to seize the munitions store in Brazzaville on the 
28
th
; the corporal happened to be Jean-Bedel Bokassa, later President (and erstwhile 
emperor) of the Central African Republic.
34
 After seizing the munitions, Delange and his 
European subordinates distributed arms to the non-dispersed Sara troops and seized 
control of the military camp outside Brazzaville. Likewise, one of Delange’s lieutenants 
led a group of Sara riflemen to attack positions around the Governor-General’s office, 
making the military operation forcing General Husson’s surrender an African execution, 
albeit under European command.
35
 
African soldiers actively participated in the rally of Brazzaville by obeying their 
Gaullist officers even as those officers’ orders turned Africans’ guns against other 
Europeans. Europeans traced this compliance to the soldiers’ Sara ethnicity, a claim 
which would necessitate greater research in Chad and the former AEF territories through 
oral histories and family memory to trace back the motivations of the participating 
soldiers. 
 
Non-compliance in the Gabon Campaign 
The Gabon conflict, sometimes characterized as a Franco-French conflict to 
highlight the fratricidal nature of the conflict between the Gaullists and pro-Vichy forces, 
also entailed an Afro-African conflict, as African soldiers under the command of both 
sides battled one another under the orders of their competing officers. Cameroonian and 
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Congolese soldiers fought and won the conquest of Gabon, since these formed “the core 
recruits of the first battalions” constituted by the new Gaullist administrations in those 
colonies to complete the rally of AEF.
36
 African compliance had progressive results in at 
least one case, since Africans participated in the highly skilled tasks of the air force, 
usually reserved for Europeans, during the Libreville operation, in addition to their 
participation as part of the Gaullist military forces.
37
 
More interestingly, however, certain instances of non-compliance by soldiers in 
the Gabon campaign provide insight into the agency retained by African soldiers even 
under European command. 
Throughout the Gabonese campaign, pro-Vichy French officers abandoned 
colonial towns, leaving African soldiers without commanders. These African soldiers 
usually remained and rallied to the Gaullist forces. Thus, after the bombing of Mitzic by 
Gaullist planes, British observers noted that the European officers and colonists 
abandoned the town, fleeing toward Libreville or Spanish Guinea (now Equatorial 
Guinea), while “native troops…[started] to rally at Mitzig [sic].”38 The Mitzic example of 
African soldiers failing to follow their officers attests to a African soldiers’ agency to 
adjust to the evolving military situation. Thus, the soldiers in Mitzic opted not to resist 
the oncoming Gaullist forces, perhaps influenced by the exercise of air power against 
Mitzic. Even in opting not to act, though, the African soldiers demonstrated agency by 
making a choice, and their choices proved demonstrably different from the choices made 
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by their European officers. The Mitzic operation reflects African agency to resist the 
Gaullists as well, though, since sixty partisans attacked the “convoys from the back,” 
injuring two officers and delaying the advance into Mitzic.
39
 
The Gaullist siege of Lambaréné repeated the pattern established at Mitzic. 
African troops fought on both sides of the conflict, as “four native companies from 
Brazzaville” laid siege to Lambaréné, while “around eight companies of natives” 
defended the town.
40
 As at Mitzic, once the Gaullist attack began in earnest, “the officers 
abandoned their troops.”41 Gaullist accounts claim that this abandonment was the cause 
of the subsequent pillage of the city before the Gaullist forces occupied the city. Adolphe 
Sicé, surgeon general at Brazzaville, directly connects the two events, claiming the 
officers’ flight left “the administrative post to be pillaged.”42 Raymond Waag, a bitter 
pro-Vichy prisoner writing from an anti-Gaullist perspective, reverses the attribution, 
claiming “the Gaullists” sacked “all the stores of the town,” a pillage in which “the 
Europeans participated, along with their [African soldiers].” He seems to write with 
disgust of how “diverse merchandise was taken, to be sold, to the natives, by the [African 
soldiers],” and claims one Gaullist officer even approved Africans raiding a wine cellar, 
saying “they are doing well.”43 British observers fail to mention any pillage, however, 
noting that “native troops [were] wandering around Lambaréné without arms.”44 
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Whatever may have happened at Lambaréné after the European officers abandoned it, 
Africans made conscious decisions not to follow their European officers in flight, 
preferring to remain in the city either to enjoy rare freedom of movement or to capitalize 
on the chaotic situation to gain material benefit. 
One of the most interesting incidents uncovered in French archives comes from 
Booué, a town along the Ogooué River, captured by the Gaullists on October 23, 1940. 
The Gaullist account claims that in Booué on October 22, the pro-Vichy administrator 
Goedert dispatched three Africans (Mombo Kombila, Marcel M’Fain, and Emmanuel 
Ango) to notify a nearby post about Gaullist forces and movements. Upon arriving in 
Booué, the Gaullist commander noted the absence of the three Africans and dispatched 
three other African soldiers (Goma, Youdengué, and Lebissa) to retrieve them. Goedert, 
however, claimed that one of the Africans, Mombo Kombila, had fled the outpost of his 
own accord.
45
  
The oral transcripts appended to the Gaullist commander’s report on the incident 
give a glimpse into the relations between and among Africans and Europeans in wartime 
Gabon. The Kombila case will be considered first, with the largely separate M’Fain case 
considered second. 
Kombila claims he visited Goedert’s office the night of October 22, having been 
summoned by Emmanuel Ango, a detainee being used as a writer for Goedert’s office, on 
Goedert’s behalf. At Goedert’s office, Goedert ordered him “to walk to Touka [a post 
downriver from Booué] tonight,” paying attention “to not have yourself arrested by the 
guards that the new whites have brought here.” “If the guards from Libreville are not at 
                                                             
45 “Rapport du Lieutenant d’Infanterie Coloniale Desbiey Jules, de l’État-Major du Commandant Supérieur 
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Touka” he should continue all the way to N’Djolé, a larger post farther downriver, in 
order to “leave [a letter, written in Alsatian] with Monsieur Hommel.” He encountered no 
soldiers of any kind throughout his nighttime march to Touka, and arriving there around 
10 AM on October 23, discovered that the soldiers stationed there had only gone as far as 
Boleko, between N’Djolé and Touka, but then turned around to return to N’Djolé. 
Despite Goedert’s orders to take his messages as far as N’Djolé, Kombila “decided to 
return to Booué,” and during the course of his return he was hailed by the three Gaullist-
dispatched searchers, with whom he returned voluntarily to Booué.
46
 Thus, Kombila 
deliberately chose not to go as far as N’Djolé, perhaps reflecting an apathy about the need 
to fight and die for a certain segment of the French colonists against another segment of 
the French colonists. Kombila’s story is corroborated by the testimony of Staff Sergeant 
Goma, a fellow Bapounou (or Punu), who certified that Kombila “made no difficulty in 
coming to Booué with the two guards and myself.”47 Another guard who helped Goma in 
tracking Kombila offers a nuance to Kombila’s story, however, adding that he started his 
return to Booué because he “had not wanted to go any farther and push toward 
N’Djolé.”48 As Goma’s other companion, Youdengué, put it, Kombila simply “preferred” 
to forego a long trip to N’Djolé.49 
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Separate from the case of Kombila, the M’Fain case further demonstrates how 
Africans could navigate the seemingly regimented world of the colonial military to serve 
their own interests and meet their own needs. Marcel M’Fain claims that he was 
dispatched, as he had been several times before, by Monsieur Fontaine, chief 
administrator of the Djouah département, to retrieve deserters. Returning to Booué by 
way of his home village (where he visited his wife), he met a messenger who instructed 
him not to return to Booué. Despite this order, M’Fain continued, arriving the next day in 
Gbanda. In Gbanda, he claims that he met Emmanuel Ango, “a prisoner who served as 
writer for the major’s office.” M’Fain claims that Ango gave him a letter from Goedert to 
deliver to the sergeant commanding the reinforcement force en route from N’Djolé to 
Booué. M’Fain also claims that Ango specified that he was instructed to travel by night to 
avoid being seen “by the guards that the new whites led from Moyen-Congo.” M’Fain 
claims he accompanied Ango as far as Booué, but was sure to avoid detection by the 
post’s guards. Then, after darkness fell, M’Fain began working his way back toward 
N’Djolé, avoiding the main road to avoid being sighted by Gaullist troops, but en route 
heard news that the reinforcement column had turned back to N’Djolé, allowing the 
occupation of Booué  “by the Sara from Moyen-Congo” to stand unchallenged.50 
Another soldier, a Sara named Nouba, was dispatched on October 22 to compel 
M’Fain to return after word came to Booué that he had stopped returning to Booué and 
changed course to go to N’Djolé. Nouba caught up with M’Fain around 6:30 PM on 
October 23 in a village along the route to N’Djolé, and M’Fain returned to Booué without 
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protesting.
51
 M’Fain admitted in interrogation to carrying a letter in Alsatian addressed to 
“M. Hummel” at N’Djolé.52 
Ango claims that on October 22 around 5 PM, he went to Goedert’s home, where 
his boss had been home sick, to report on the day’s events. He claims that Goedert, 
relaying orders from the chief of the département Fontaine, sent him to tell all the 
recently departed regional messengers not to return to Booué. He claims that Goedert 
gave him two lists, 50 francs, and ordered him to retrieve Mombo Kombila, which he did. 
He claims that he entered with Kombila, witnessing Goedert give him a letter to deliver 
to the commander of the reinforcements coming to Booué from N’Djolé. After being 
pressed by the interrogator, Ango admits that around noon that day, he had gone to a 
village only five kilometers from Booué, where he found M’Fain with his wife, and 
delivered another letter from Goedert, to be taken to the reinforcements en route also.
53
 
In terms of the triangular relationship of Ango-M’Fain-Goedert, all of the 
competing claims do not entirely line up. For instance, M’Fain claims that he met Ango 
at a village (Gbanda) two days after meeting his wife at another village (Mangaba), seven 
hours’ walk from Booué.54 However, Ango claims that he met M’Fain in a village only 
five kilometers from Booué (Ebaganda), where M’Fain was with his wife, and he makes 
no mention of M’Fain accompanying him back to Booué.55 Moreover, Ango’s presence 
in Booué the evening of October 22 is confirmed by the testimony of Kombila, who 
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corroborates that he was summoned by Ango to Goedert’s house, although Kombila 
claims that the administrator Fontaine, as well as a French doctor, was present with M. 
Goedert,
56
 while Ango claims that they entered to find Goedert alone.
57
 The M’Fain-
Ango stories compare even more ambiguously when one considers that M’Fain claims to 
have heard the order not to return to Booué from a different messenger in his wife’s 
village of Mangaba,
58
 while Ango claims to have communicated this message to a variety 
of messengers in the near vicinity of Booué.
59
 
What actually happened from October 22-23 in Booué and in the villages between 
Booué and N’Djolé seems less important than the fact that M’Fain and Ango crafted 
particular versions of the events in order to provide space for their own activities: M’Fain 
to visit his wife, and Ango to account for fifty francs he claims were given him by an 
ailing Goedert, but which are mentioned nowhere else in accounts of the events and of 
which even Ango does not provide the alleged purpose. Especially given his status as a 
prisoner, he commands less credibility than Kombila, who appeared to have cooperated 
with the relevant authorities at each step of the way. Even Kombila shows himself not 
terribly concerned with executing his orders exactly, preferring not to continue all the 
way to N’Djolé but to return to Booué on his own initiative and against the orders of 
Goedert (corroborated by Ango’s account of the conversation between Goedert and 
Ango
60
). Each of these Africans, even or especially amid the uncertainty of fratricidal 
Franco-French conflict, find space within which to retain some freedom and flexibility. 
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These Africans obeyed orders selectively: Kombila opting not to continue to N’Djolé and 
M’Fain opting to continue toward Booué despite claiming he was ordered otherwise.  
The African perspectives communicated in these depositions give some small 
clues into how the African soldiers involved conceived of the contemporary conflict. 
Both M’Fain and Kombila claim that Ango and Goedert, respectively, referred to the 
Gaullist invaders as ‘the guards’ brought in by the “new whites.” The racialized (white) 
rather than nationalized or politicized (French or Gaullist, respectively) term applied to 
the opponent may reflect that Africans viewed their colonial dominators less as French, 
German, pro-Vichy or pro-de Gaulle, and more as previous and current rulers. Thus, the 
invaders are referred to as “new whites,” with their African military forces seen as 
“brought” or “led” into Gabon.61 M’Fain even assigns an ethnic specificity to these 
troops, describing Booué as occupied by the Sara specifically, though the fact that he was 
retrieved by Nouba, identified as a Sara, might have contributed to this characterization.
62
 
The substantial documentary evidence for this militarily minor, if not 
insignificant, incident reveals that behind the larger military movements within Gabon, 
Africans operated on their own agendas within the fluid situation, negotiating a new 
position for themselves in the wake of the Gaullist takeover. For instance, Kombila felt 
the need to justify his own choices in his deposition to the Gaullist lieutenant, thus 
assuming that he had agency in the situation. He uses the argument that he obeyed the 
superior at hand, since “Monsieur Goedert being my direct superior, I had no reason not 
                                                             
61 “Procès-Verbal de Déposition de Témoin: M’Fain Marcel,” p. 7; and “Procès-Verbal de Déposition de 
Témoin: Kombila Mombo,” p. 5. ANOM AEF/GGAEF/5D/187. 
62 “Procès-Verbal de Déposition de Témoin: M’Fain Marcel,” p. 7; and “Procès-Verbal de Déposition de 
Témoin: Nouba,” p. 6. ANOM AEF/GGAEF/5D/187. 
21 
 
to obey him and so I departed immediately.”63 M’Fain also felt the need to defend 
himself, unprompted, by claiming that he “did not know what that letter contained,” when 
presented with the Alsatian letter found on his person by Nouba.
64
  
These Africans assumed their own agency within the contemporary situation to 
the extent that they felt the need to defend the rationale behind their actions, or preempt 
accusations of cooperation with the pro-Vichy administrators. Since such factors were 
present in such a minor case, historians should explore the possibility of other stories of 
African agency, at least during the military operations in Gabon. Further examples may 
not have the same official documentation, but oral and local historians in Gabon may be 
able to discover other examples of African activity outside European control during this 
period. The chaos of wartime may have been liberating to these African soldiers, 
providing a window of opportunity to follow their own paths, even if just for an evening 
or two, beyond the regimentation of European colonial control. 
 
The Background of Compliance 
Even when, as in Brazzaville and in much of the Gabon campaign, African 
soldiers simply followed orders, we can look more generally at the reasons why Africans 
would become soldiers for a European army to trace the agency of Africans. This 
examination reveals both constraints on African agency, in the form of colonial 
compulsion into military service, and non-coercive influences on African agency, in the 
form of real social benefits motivating Africans to accept rather than rebel against 
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systemic coercion. In 2009, Jean-François Muracciole summed up this duality well when 
calling African soldiers “authentic Free French but false volunteers.”65 
The French system of volunteer soldiers in fact rested on coercion farmed out to 
the French-appointed chiefs. Recruitment only rested “in theory on voluntary 
engagement.”66 Bernard Lanne, discussing voluntarism in Chad, conflates how Sara 
“were generally volunteers” with the fact that “constraint had to be used – exercised by 
notables and chiefs.”67 Each French-appointed African chief was accountable for a quota 
of soldiers (like any other raw material to be exploited out of Africa), leading many 
chiefs to designate certain men for recruitment to appease the pressure from the colonial 
officials, who would also pressure Africans in their villages to enlist, “without having the 
time to say goodbye to [their] parents.”68 European officials were able to guarantee, with 
certainty, that pressuring the African elite would stimulate the resumption of recruitment 
so that “the requested number of recruits will be attained.”69 One French colonist 
depicted this process in a more benign form, telling how marching through Cameroon his 
forces would wait at important towns for “more or less voluntary candidates” selected 
following “the decision of their village chief.”70 
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Recruiters created terror, such that “scenes of panic were frequent in the villages, 
fleers entering the brush and veritable manhunts organized in order to conscript them.”71 
One Brazzaville resident claims that “during the War, Brazzaville was completely 
dominated by fear,” “the sight of [soldiers] sent people scurrying into the bush,” and 
“men sought medicines that might protect them against recruitment” due to the “forced 
enlistment of soldiers.”72 One Cameroonian author uses language evocative of the 
European slave trade, describing how “broad-shouldered, athletic natives were picked up 
and tied with a cord around their waist” to be led off to France.73 The Gaullist forces 
certainly used as much brutality as earlier French administrations, using “all means, 
including the most brutal, to enroll Africans in the French army.”74 
Even in the face of overwhelming pressure through the French colonial system, 
Africans retained a certain degree of agency through their ability to flee.
75
 For example, 
one community in Oubangui-Chari, left in limbo by the political upheavals of summer 
1940, migrated back and forth across the Chari River between French AEF and the 
Belgian Congo as the authorities on each bank alternatively recruited or eased 
recruitment as their governments exited and entered the war amid the defeat of both 
metropoles.
76
 Richard Joseph certified that flight remained an option, albeit a desperate 
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one, for Cameroonians seeking to escape the privations of colonial rule.
77
 The famed 
sociologist Georges Balandier noted Africans’ frequent recourse to “escape to some part 
of the country that was less strictly controlled” in the face of heavy government demands, 
showing Africans’ ability to enter zones freer of European control than others.78 Catholic 
missionaries also noted this propensity, which accelerated markedly after the declaration 
of war in 1939.
79
 
Africans’ ability to flee the arm of the state limited the success of French coercive 
recruitment. As Jacques Valette notes, all their brutality only put 16,000 men at the 
disposition of the Free French authorities in AEF, a small number next to the 139,000 
mobilized for service in Europe from across sub-Saharan Africa in 1939.
80
 The French 
ability to coerce African military service became weaker still in the desert versus the 
riverine regions of Chad. On the one hand, the nomadic Islamic groups of the north 
“superbly ignored Free France” whereas most of the Free French recruiting came from 
the Saras, who had been particularly victimized and targeted in French racialist 
conceptualization, depicting them as passive but warlike, particularly big children in the 
French racializing mindset.
81
 
Despite the coercive nature of the system, there are reasons Africans might join 
the colonial army of their own accord. As Lormier pointed, the army “could represent a 
chance to find a certain dignity” bringing value outside of a second-class status as an 
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object of colonization with “wages, medals, [and] the prestige of a uniform.”82 Pensions 
after 15 years of service for career soldiers,
83
  the promise of social mobility through 
acquiring French language skills, basic job skills, and the wages, which accumulated over 
a career might provide the bedrock for urban financial independence after the completion 
of service.
84
 Phyllis Martin, extensively studying Brazzaville society during the colonial 
era, has noted that “not least among the reasons for looking for employment with whites 
was that clothing often came with the job,” such as the red fez of the tirailleurs, which 
“still commanded respect when it was worn by veterans or by the local police.”85 Marc de 
Possesse, observing recruitment in Cameroon late in the war, corroborates Martin’s 
claim, noting their joyous reactions to receiving mere rags since “it was the first time any 
of these men had owned anything,” ignoring the possibility of alternative conceptions of 
ownership that might have been prevalent, but nonetheless confirming a desire for 
acquisition among those he observed.
86
 Acquiring these goods is noted as a draw by 
another author, who also notes the fact that Africans serving in the army escaped forced 
labor.
87
 
Studying recruitment in late 1939 in French West Africa, Isabelle Bournier and 
Marc Pottier cite the unexpected application of 100,000 over the goal of 50,000, as 
recruits were inspired by “a spirit of adventure,” a desire to see other countries, “the 
desire to escape from misery with the future wages, [and] the sense that military 
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hierarchy was less unequal than colonial order.”88 Such an optimistic view also cites the 
amorphous ‘loyalism,’ but even if not all these cases were voluntary, these emotions 
could be assumed to motivate young men to volunteer for war in Africa as elsewhere. 
Jean-Bedel Bokassa, future president (and erstwhile emperor) of the Central African 
Republic, was motivated by a desire to see the world, following his grandfather’s advice 
that observed that “the men who joined the French army learned as much as if he had 
lived three lives” and his own admiration of “soldiers, uniforms, and the exploits of great 
generals.”89  
Some Africans also pursued French military service in pursuit of ulterior 
liberation, since veterans could “obtain the full French citizenship, under certain 
conditions,” although the actual consummation of this ambition was rare.90 Indeed, 
Henri-Richard Manga Mado depicts his enlistment in the French military as “liberty.”91 
Such political motivations for voluntarism appeared most often in Cameroon. Paul Soppo 
Priso, the force behind the pro-French Jeucafra movement in Cameroon (discussed 
below), may have pursued his agenda of African recruitment in Cameroon in order to 
pursue this equalizing agenda. For example, Pierre Messmer remembered arriving in 
Douala in October 1940, seeing black men carrying signs insisiting they enlist as “French 
soldiers: Yes,” not as “[African] Riflemen: No.”92 
Thus, Europeans in Cameroon were loath to recruit Cameroonian natives directly 
until the desperation after the Armistice, hoping to prevent Cameroonian acquisition of 
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French rights.
93
 This limitation placed on Africans’ rights even to sacrifice their lives in 
military service attest to the retention of racist French views, despite their official 
assimilationist ideology, such that one Senegalese recruit complained that “we were 
never considered wholly French,” an obvious disappointment when high aspirations were 
tied to an idealized egalitarian military.
94
 Some Africans genuinely volunteered. For 
example, in Cameroon, Richard Joseph noted that “although they were not required to 
undertake military service under the terms of the Mandate, many still volunteered and 
participated in the campaign led by Leclerc against the Italians in Libya.”95 The African 
interpreter Jacques Kuoh Moukouri remembered real voluntary service among his 
compatriots, who “engaged as volunteers,” in such numbers that Leclerc had to urge 
patience among the volunteers.
96
 The voluntarism of the few should not discount the 
coercion of the many, or vice versa. 
Even if Africans merely followed the orders of their officers, their presence in the 
colonial army reflected a degree of agency, although that agency was limited by the 
coercive system of recruitment practiced in French colonies. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
AFRICAN AUDIENCES IN THE RALLIES 
 
The African residents of the French colonies in AEF made up a passive audience 
of the political events of 1940. Without political power, and unless they were in the 
military, without the power of force, these Africans were not consulted in the battles over 
the territories’ foreign policies. Africans demonstrated agency in their responses to 
Gaullist actions, both by affirming those actions and responding with indifference. 
Indifference reflects agency, even if unconscious, rejecting a Eurocentric view for one 
more concerned with Africans’ own interests. Africans used the same kind of attentisme 
that metropolitan Frenchmen did, awaiting whether the Germans would prove victorious 
or not before deciding whether to cooperate with the Vichy government. One European 
colonist in Moyen-Congo described Africans’ attitudes in those terms, noting that during 
the crisis of May 1940, “the natives, more detached, waited for ‘what would come,’ as 
they had always done in the brush, amid the too-often repeated changes of 
administrators.”97 Also, anti-Axis sentiment may have motivated the affirmations offered 
by Africans to the Gaullist victories, differentiating that sentiment from a necessarily pro-
French sentiment. 
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African Awareness 
Historians should avoid the fallacious conclusion that Africans remained ignorant 
of how events in their native colonies and the colonial metropole affected one another.
98
 
Particularly in the urban, capital cities, Africans made note of events going on in far off 
Europe. One Brazzaville woman claimed that “we had always followed the development 
of events in France passionately.”99 Jonathan Derrick, a historian of Douala, claims that 
“in Douala, at least, Africans were well aware of events in Europe.”100 Particularly after 
the outbreak of war in 1939, and then into the fall of France in 1940, Cameroonians’ 
awareness of the international situation was “more abundant and more various” than ever 
before.
101
 Indeed, news of the French defeat in June 1940 led many Cameroonians to say 
that the Germans would return, and Africans who had cooperated with the Germans 
during their rule began to teach German to would-be future collaborators.
102
 In rural 
areas, African awareness faded, as Lanne notes that only a small number of Chadians in 
1940 “had information on the outside world.”103 Even in Chad, though, the African 
population became “privy to events thanks to eavesdropping servants and cooks.”104 
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African workers in European homes often disseminated information from the press, 
reading discarded magazines and newspapers and overhearing conversations, 
demonstrating the diffusion of information in colonial circles thanks to the close 
proximity of African ears with European mouths.
105
 
Africans also paid attention to European internecine politics in the colonial 
capitals. Thus, in the days before the coup d’état in Brazzaville, colonist Jean de 
Puytorac’s African friends “asked [him] to warn them. Warn them of what? I wondered. 
Their responses proved to me that they were aware of what was coming.”106 In 
Brazzaville, the Africans perhaps paid better attention than some Europeans, as in the 
case of Blanche Ackermann-Athanassiades, who sent an African servant to warn a 
hapless customs manager not to take his normal route home since the coup plotters 
blocked it to isolate the governor-general.
107
 In Cameroon, Jacques Kuoh Moukouri 
remembered how the villagers knew of a development in the Gaullist-Vichy conflict 
before he himself did, as a bureaucrat within the colonial power structure.
108
 
 
Indifference and Self-preservation 
Africans often proved indifferent to the outcome of the Franco-French struggle. 
Their attentisme corresponds to other populations under occupation, simply waiting to 
join the winning side in order to maximize survival. Thus, Pierre Messmer noted that “the 
Africans were passive” since they viewed the conflict among Frenchmen simply as 
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“‘white business’ in which it was wise not to get oneself mixed up.”109 A French observer 
remembered how Cameroonian soldiers shrugged off the Vichy-Gaullist conflict, 
attributing it to “the ways of whites,” unknowable and irrelevant to their opinions.110  
Messmer recounts an Africanization of the war as “a war among white tribes which 
[Africans] have been dragged into.”111 
African indifference proved a boon to the Gaullists who raided the Cameroonian 
port of Douala over the night of August 26-27, although it represented worldviews firmly 
out of line with the European Gaullists’ fixation on a French conflict. As Émile Tutenges 
notes in his memories of the Douala raid, when the canoes landed at the docks of Douala, 
the Frenchmen “saw a small group of native customs officers, pistols at their belts,” but 
when Tutenges approached their chief, he was obeyed immediately, allowing the 
Frenchmen to enter the city in a highly unconventional manner, and eventually seize 
control of the territory. Tutenges attributes his success to the fact that he wore a French 
uniform, unquestionably obeyed by the African ‘subject,’ although the possibility 
remains that these customs officers were able to surmise the illegality of these 
Europeans’ actions, like the canoe rowers had done, but chose to comply nonetheless. 
Earlier in Tiko, a similarly unquestioning (British) Cameroonian guard had permitted 
these Europeans to retake their confiscated arms for the raid, which Tutenges also 
evaluates as a racialist deference, since “the prestige of the European, at that time, was 
very much real.”112 Fratacci, one of the raiders, overcame the dozen Africans guarding 
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the Post Office, finding them sleeping, but their sergeant recognized Fratacci, who 
promptly said “It’s you, sergeant! We’re very glad!” before going back to sleep, deferring 
to the known European.
113
 The African’s poor performance may indicate a subtle form of 
colonial resistance, or at least indifference and finding space within the imperial system 
for personal freedom. 
Securing Yaoundé after seizing control of Douala depended more on the 
obedience and compliance of African soldiers, notably those under the command of 
Leclerc’s collaborator Major Dio. These African troops, under orders from their 
European officers complying with Gaullist objectives, actually executed the orders to 
secure Yaoundé.
114
 This operation comprised an interesting incident, as the African 
soldiers under Gaullist command occupied the Yaoundé police station, which had been 
vacated by the pro-Vichy police chief while he searched for the Gaullist culprit who cut 
the telephone lines from Yaoundé to Douala overnight to permit the Gaullist occupation. 
Returning to find his office occupied by African soldiers, the police chief immediately 
declared himself a Gaullist – though the fact that the soldiers were African may not have 
been important.
115
 Nonetheless, the incident represents a reversal in the traditional 
colonial power relationship, as African soldiers exerted power over a European colonist, 
ironically one charged with guaranteeing law-and-order. 
African indifference also aided the Gaullists in September when a small core of 
Gaullist Europeans and Africans executed a ruse to force the surrender of the port, 
enabled by deference shown to the Europeans by African soldiers. Walking into a full 
company of African soldiers gathered in the city center of Mayumba to defend it from 
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Gaullist attack, the African soldiers, although faltering initially on not recognizing these 
Europeans in particular, saluted them and allowed them to pass. The African soldiers 
saluted the Gaullists, seeing only French officers, not Gaullists.
116
 The passivity and 
deference of African soldiers to their European officers evidenced in this incident, as in 
the incidents in the Douala raid, seem to suggest an African indifference to which 
Frenchmen were in command. As Ollandet commented, “the issue simply involved a 
change in master,”117 and another African agreed, remembering how he and his 
compatriots “recognized that ‘the white is the same,’ whether he be English, French, or 
German.”118 
Such indifference proved wise in retrospect for Africans living with the Gaullist 
administrations, which did not differ radically from pro-Vichy administrations. For 
example, one consequence of the Free French establishing Douala as their post-rally 
capitol for Cameroon was the requisitioning of urban Africans’ homes and bodies. Ateba 
Yene tells of his father, Hermann Yene, hosting Pierre Messmer (later prime minister of 
France under Georges Pompidou from 1972-1974) and two other Gaullist officers in their 
home, leaving the Yene household in a hastily-constructed hut. The symbolism of a 
European forcing a Westernized, “evolved” African out of his urban, ‘modern’ home into 
a hut, thus reversing France’s professed ‘mission civilisatrice’ in the interest of European 
comfort, is deeply ironic. Beyond reclaiming the home, the European soldiers also 
claimed the bodies of Douala’s women. Cameroonian historian Théodore Ateba Yene 
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recounts the spectacle of “the forced gathering of all the young, chesty, virgin women in 
order to throw them into the [military camp]” for the pleasure of the legionnaires. The 
Gaullists, at least for Douala, merely represented another episode of European 
exploitation of Africans’ territory, here in the most domestic spheres.119 
The African audience to the Gaullist rallies of 1940 also acted for self-
preservation. Thus, Félix Éboué seemed to identify sentiments among the African 
population turning against the armistice accepted by the Vichy government, if only for 
economic self-interest. In a telegram to Pierre Boisson on July 29, Éboué complained that 
the “native population” was “troubled by high prices” and by the rumor beginning to 
spread that France “was undertaking war against England.”120 Writing to de Gaulle two 
days before, on July 27, Éboué worried that “the indecisive attitude of the leaders created 
disarray which has now reached even some aware elements of the native population.”121 
From these hints, we can see that the European-educated Éboué took note of native unrest 
in light of the instability of colonial life after the defeat of the metropole. Looking at 
these comments from a different angle, we see Africans disturbed not for the sanctity of 
the French empire but concerned about the effects of political instability on their personal 
economies and wellbeing. A later French historian, examining French censors’ notes on 
African correspondence during this time period, noted little concern with the political 
situation, and more concern with personal and financial questions.
122
 Likewise, Africans 
demonstrated agency around the attack on Libreville, as natives fled en masse from 
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Libreville in late October, hoping to avoid the conflict and accept the new rule of the Free 
French forces.
123
 
 
Affirmations of the Gaullist Victory 
Africans also demonstrated agency in choosing to affirm, through public 
celebrations, the Gaullist victories in AEF. Though retrospective on the rallies as a series 
of fait accompli, Africans nonetheless demonstrated agency whether they sought to 
please the new administrations or expressed genuine approval. The Gaullist regime saw 
these demonstrations as critical, given its tenuous legal and geographical claim to 
represent the French state. Moreover, if the public had opposed the military actions with 
protests or non-compliance, the audacious rallies would have failed. The Gaullists needed 
the African audiences to accept the rallies, and Africans did. Although they excluded 
Africans from any role in determining the orientation of their homelands, the Gaullists 
expected African leaders to “declare their loyalty to whoever won,” and “they did so.”124 
Cameroon, having been colonized by Germany before the Great War in 1914-
1918, seems to have followed the ongoing crisis in Europe more closely than other parts 
of AEF. The Vichy envoy Platon, visiting Cameroon in late July, would have little 
incentive to overplay an African Gaullism, making his report to Boisson all the more 
interesting. He claims that around “80% [of the European population] is resolutely on the 
side of the English,” which Governor-General Brunot claimed echoed the “same 
sentiments [which] animate the native population.” Brunot may have had reason to 
exaggerate an African discontent with this decision in order to bolster his excuse for 
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bowing to ‘public pressure’ in aligning Cameroon thus far with the British Cameroons 
and British Nigeria.
125
 Pro-Vichy Raymond Waag visited Gaullist Yaoundé on 
September 11, 1940, and in his missive of early 1941 to Pétain, he notes with disgust how 
“here, everyone is ‘GAULLIST’ and shows it,” even the “Cameroonians, [who] wear 
coats of arms with the Cross of Lorraine” [the emblem of Free France].126 When the 
newly formed Free French forces from Britain landed in Douala after failing to land in 
Dakar in late September, one of the French officers remembered later how even “the 
schoolchildren (some miniscule, which made them seem even more black!)” lined the 
streets, “waving their little flags.”127 Africans demonstrated agency, participating in 
affirming the Gaullist victories whether because they thought it was expected or because 
they genuinely affirmed the victories.  
In Moyen-Congo, anecdotal evidence indicates the presence of at least some 
genuine political feeling in favor of Gaullism. A. Sicé recounts being approached by 
several Africans in Brazzaville on June 23, 1940. The older Africans, old coworkers of 
Sicé’s at the Pasteur Institute in Congo, Health Service employees, and the Senegalese 
chief Amadou Diop, asked Sicé to explain why France had signed an armistice with 
Germany. They recounted that the armistice “had not only surprised but devastated the 
native population,” who thus “supplicated that [the French] whom they know well not 
abandon” them.128 In Poto-Poto near Brazzaville, Diop showed Sicé a placard 
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proclaiming “We want to stay French,” which Sicé cites as “irrefutable proof of the 
loyalism of these blacks of Africa who stayed so deeply attached to France.”129  
The city of Brazzaville greeted Charles de Gaulle with genuine enthusiasm, as 
recounted by several Free French eyewitnesses, although their propensity to exaggerate 
the popular nature of these events must be taken into consideration. Sicé claims that the 
“European town and the African villages were taken out en masse” to the airstrip to greet 
de Gaulle on October 24, and that among the many “natives waving the flag” was Diop, 
surrounded by subordinates waving the “We want to stay French” placard. Sicé perhaps 
betrays exaggeration when he goes on to justify this occurrence, explaining that “the 
enthusiasm of the natives was assuredly spontaneous.”130 Another French resident of 
Brazzaville, Blanche Ackermann-Athanassiaous, confirms Sicé’s depiction of the 
reception, also writing that Brazzaville “in full” came to the airstrip to welcome de 
Gaulle, including “the enormous crowd from the two villages of Bacongo and Poto-
Poto,” the native districts of Brazzaville.131 Jean de Puytorac also certified the presence 
of a “crowd of natives, who came by the thousands,” at the arrival of de Gaulle.132 
 
Genuine Anti-Axis Sentiment among Africans? 
Some accounts claim that Africans fought for the French, not out of pro-French 
sentiment, but in opposition to Germans and the Nazi ideology. Indeed, some less 
prominent narratives of events in AEF claim that Africans were motivated to fight, 
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particularly in Gabon, by being told that they were fighting Germans there, even when 
those arguments were patently untrue. The pro-Vichy Aumasson, president of the 
Gabonese Chamber of Commerce, claimed while in Dakar as an exile of the Gaullist 
military victory in Gabon that the six hundred “Saras” fighting in Gabon had been told 
that “Libreville was defended by the Germans.”133 Another contemporary, with less 
interest in contradicting the Gaullist account, corroborates this claim, saying that “the 
opening of hostilities [in Gabon] rested…on a lie as shameless in its development as 
mysterious in its origins,” that the forces were going “to fight in Gabon important forces 
of the Axis, Germans and Italians.”134 The assumption of higher Sara motivation to fight 
Germans rather than wicked Frenchmen shows actual anti-Axis sentiment among the 
Africans. 
Particularly in Cameroon, anti-German sentiment was indeed expressed before 
and during the war, which might be expected to continue into the period of the Armistice. 
The Cameroonian Union, “composed of ‘European and native chiefs’” formed in 1938 to 
“defend the interests of Cameroon,” sending identical letters to British Prime Minister 
Chamberlain, U.S. President Roosevelt, and French premier Daladier “protesting against 
any possible return of territory to Germany.”135 Their letter contains a decidedly anti-
German strain, claiming that “we have known German domination and we have no wish 
to return to a country which persecutes our race [presumably, black Africans].”136 More 
importantly, the French Cameroonian Youth (Jeucafra), formed in 1938 with French 
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funding in order to counter a pro-independence movement, had as a secondary goal to 
stand in opposition to Germany’s return to Cameroon, albeit with the pro-French goal of 
integration into the French Empire as a colony rather than an officially League of 
Nations-mandated territory.
137
  
Anti-German sentiment had merit in French Cameroon, given memories of 
“abusive acquisitions, particularly through falsified contracts” and forced labor, 
volunteers being short since “the reputation of the plantations was not good.”138 The 
historical memory of a previous colonization would be a legitimate source for decision-
making, since even people only 30-40 years old would have lived through the contentious 
years of Franco-German debate over the return of Germany’s ‘lost colony,’ and “the 
conquered [Cameroonians], just like the conquerors [the French], integrated a variable 
international dimension into their history.”139 Richard Joseph, studying political 
conditions in Cameroon in the 1970s, confirms that “much hardship was suffered by 
Camerounians under German rule” and that even sixty years later, “in nearly every region 
of Cameroun…a particular German administrator is remembered for the barbaric depths 
to which he descended in bringing civilization to the ‘primitives.’”140 At least one Duala 
chief, Paraiso, opposed Germany out of vengeance against German appropriation of his 
family’s property during their rule.141 
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Africans feared German colonization outside of Cameroon, also. Although 
Gaullists obviously carefully selected certain anecdotes, the anecdotal evidence 
constitutes evidence nonetheless, even if not representative of the full picture. Sicé claims 
that the signature of the Armistice with Germany created “unquestionable anxiety” since 
“they remembered the arrival of the Germans” in 1911-1914, colonizing the so-called 
‘Bec de Canard’ as compensation for Morocco after the Second Morocco Crisis in 1911. 
Fearing German re-colonization, Sicé claims that the African leaders in the villages 
around Brazzaville came to him “beseeching that we, French that they knew well, not 
abandon Equatorial Africa and its inhabitants to the Germans.”142 Another Gaullist 
account, explicitly propagandistic (serving as material for the Free French lobby in the 
United States during the war), cites another anecdote from a chief in Logone on the 
Cameroon-Chad border, saying “I know the Germans” and that “they killed my father’s 
people.”143 Both of these examples, it should be noted, concern direct colonial contact 
with the Germans in and around Cameroon, making German rule a more concrete reality 
rather than a mere conceptualization. However, Africans had no illusions about French 
rule, either, despite its brutality being glossed over by Gaullist sources, making a Franco-
German choice an ambiguous one at best. 
One account from an African author captures the ambiguity of the choices for 
Africans in Cameroon. A Fang community on the Gabon-Cameroon border remembered 
the German rule in Cameroon as “more brutal and inhuman than the French system,” 
especially resenting the Germans’ award of “quasi-absolute” power, allegedly alien to the 
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Fang leadership structure, to an already artificial ethnic-based leadership created by the 
colonial power to serve as an intermediary with the Africans. As implied in the statement 
that German rule was only “more brutal and inhuman” than French rule, the French 
period was no utopian colonial paradise. Rather, the French retained the same German-
appointed chiefs, but reduced their “exaggerated” powers. For this community, the 
French represented the lesser of two evils.
144
 In light of Nazi racial ideology denouncing 
Africans as “sub-humans,” French imperialism would certainly seem the lesser of two 
evils.
145
 
In the aftermath of the Gaullist rally in Cameroon, though, this narrative does 
seem to be supported by African actions. The Gaullist lobby in the United States quoted 
an anonymous Logone chief at the Cameroon-Congo border to support the claim of 
African opposition to Germany, citing him saying that “I know the Germans” and “they 
killed my father’s people,” whereas “the French made us free.”146 Similar arguments are 
expressed by Muracciole, who points out parenthetically, but suggestively, that the 
Africans “still remembered the German occupation,” and by Adolphe Sicé, who claims 
rather idealistically that France replaced German rule, characterized by “methods of force 
and oppression, punctuated by acts of barbarism and inhumanity, which had always 
characterized the Germanic spirit and tendency.”147 Raymond Dronne, explaining why 
African soldiers under his command continued to fight through claimed that they 
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“retained a dismal memory of German domination,” key to their decision to follow him 
as he opted for Gaullism.
148
 
Anti-Nazi and anti-German sentiment in Cameroon would appear to be paralleled 
by anti-Italian sentiment in Chad, bordering Italian Libya. A colonial report from 
February 1940 notes that, despite mobilization and its conscription of troops, there had 
been “no exoduses [across the border],” but rather movement “returning into Chad” since 
“native life is more easy in French Territory [Chad] than in Libya where grain and meat 
are rare and expensive.”149 Refugees from Libya were particularly eager to fight, as the 
initial enthusiasm for the war “still persists” in early 1940, the French needing to hold 
back the local bey, who led his community to “accept reluctantly, the idea that they 
would not return, arms in hand, to Italian territory.”150 This report cites certain Toubbou 
from Libya requesting permission to settle in French territory in order to avoid Italian war 
conscription and deprivation, deemed greater than in French Chad, and perhaps hoping 
also to avoid a war between France and Italy, which natives believed was imminent.
151
 
The French administration claimed to draw strong support from the Islamic leadership of 
northern Chad, noting that localized “religious leaders…are absolutely devoted to us,” 
perhaps in response to or creating the greater attention “given to the events [of war in 
Europe].”152  
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As for the majority of people, though, the February 1940 snapshot of Chad gives 
the sense of deep-seated apathy about the war, which retained “little attention” for the 
“masses,”153  who accepted the war with “fatalism,” desiring that the war would confine 
itself “among the whites,” with even a Franco-Italian armistice welcomed in order to end 
the war.
154
 One upshot of this apathy was that contempt for Italians eclipsed the already 
dim view of Germans in Chad, even if there was little positive attachment to the 
French.
155
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Africans participated in the rally of AEF to General de Gaulle, even if they did 
not plan the operations. Africans also constituted the audiences of the rallies, serving as 
important legitimizers for the Gaullist project to reconstruct a French polity outside the 
metropole. In both these roles, Africans exhibited agency, making conscious choices to 
control their own actions and affect the situations around them. 
African soldiers obeyed their Gaullist officers, toppling governments in Gabon 
and Moyen-Congo (Brazzaville). African soldiers involved in the Gabon campaign also 
exploited the confusion of the situation to set their own agendas. African soldiers also 
obeyed Gaullist invaders, enabling the capture of Douala and several towns during the 
Gabon campaign. The indifference of Africans to their European commanders, and of 
African publics to which regime governed them, gives us insight into the limitations of 
colonialism. Even in a total war where Europeans could mobilize the martial bodies of 
Africans as soldiers, they could not capture their minds and prompt Africans to invest 
themselves morally or nationalistically in the defense of France. The ability of Africans 
to evade the French state through migration also attests to limits to the French empire’s 
capacity to control the lives of its subjects.  
This study does not attempt to minimize the intrusiveness of the colonial 
experience, which exercised itself in forced conscription, appropriation of female bodies
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for European soldiers, and far greater pains through forced labor projects in the years 
after AEF’s rally. Rather, this study attempts to highlight the spaces within which 
Africans retained and exercised agency, such as through migration or in the vacuums 
produced in chaotic military situations such as those in Gabon. Likewise, this study 
attempts to focus on African voices to see rationales behind why Africans would act 
certain ways, such as reasons behind Africans joining the French colonial military, or 
reasons why Africans might opt to support the lesser evil of French continuation rather 
than risk the threat of German takeover. This study found limits in its European texts and 
archival research, but the presence of such clear African agency in even a Eurocentric 
research process reveals the necessity for further research, especially in Central Africa 
itself. Africans have often been voiceless in African history, less because they did not 
speak and more because no one listened. Thus, studies by African and other historians in 
Africa, particularly probing into oral histories, could reveal new perspectives on the 
events of 1940 and nuance our understandings of Africans’ involvement in the Second 
World War. I hope that this study will be the first step in such a process. 
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